1 David C. Arner, ADC # 139866 **Arizona Department of Corrections** 2 Eyman Complex/Meadows Unit P.O. Box 3300 3 Florence, Arizona 85132-3300 4 In Propria Persona 5 6 7 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA David Craig Arner, 8 9 Plaintiff. 10 -VS-Charles L. Ryan, Director, Arizona 11 Department of Corrections, 12 Defendant. 13 14

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
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# IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

No. CV2011 096782 COMPLAINT FOR SPECIAL ACTION AND **DECLARATORY JUDGMENT: Expedited Ruling Requested** 

Plaintiff in pro per David C. Arner seeks Special Action and Declaratory Judgment relief, complaining and alleging as follows.

#### I. INTRODUCTION

- This is a verified Complaint for Special Action<sup>2</sup> and Declaratory 1. Judgment, challenging the constitutionality of a statutory provision, specifically A.R.S. § 31-230.D, passed by the Arizona Legislature and signed into law by the Governor, which has an effective date of July 20, 2011.
- 2. As of July 20, 2011, A.R.S. § 31-230.D (Prisoner Spendable Accounts; Fees) authorizes the Arizona Department of Corrections ("ADC")

<sup>&</sup>quot;If a show cause procedure is used, the court shall set a speedy return date. If that procedure is not used, the usual time periods established by the Rules of Civil Procedure shall apply, but all times may be specially modified by court order to achieve expeditious determination of the cause." See Rule 4(c), Rules of **Procedure for Special Actions** (underlining added).

A copy of Plaintiff's verification is attached hereto, designated Arner **Attachment A**, and now incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.

to collect a fee on deposits made to prisoner spendable accounts; and directs that all fees so collected be deposited to the Arizona Department of Corrections Building Renewal Fund, a new fund established pursuant to **A.R.S. § 41-797.** The Director of the ADC has established a 1% fee for deposits to prisoner spendable accounts (see ¶ 14 of this Complaint).

- 3. Plaintiff asserts that the statute authorizes a fee and that the 1% fee constitutes an unconstitutional tax and a "special law" prohibited by Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 19 (9) & (20).
- **4.** This Complaint seeks special action relief in the form of an Order requiring the Director of the ADC to reimburse all fees deducted on or after July 20, 2011 pursuant to **A.R.S. § 31-230.D** from deposits made to Plaintiff's prisoner spendable account .
- **5.** This Complaint seeks declaratory relief in the form of an Order declaring **A.R.S. § 31-230.D** to be unconstitutional.

#### II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 6. This Court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of this Complaint for Special Action and Declaratory Judgment pursuant to Rule 4(b), Rules of Procedure for Special Actions (hereinafter, "R.P.S.A."); and A.R.S. § 12-1831 et seq., the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act; and pursuant to A.R.S. Const. art. 6, § 14 (Original Jurisdiction of Superior Court); A.R.S. § 12-123 (Statutory Jurisdiction of Superior Court); A.R.S. § 12-122 (Common Law Power of Superior Court); and A.R.S. Const. art. 2, § 4 (Right to Due Process), § 5 (Right of Petition), and § 13 (Equal Privileges and Immunities).
- 7. Venue in Maricopa County Superior Court is proper for this Complaint for Declaratory Judgment pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1831. Venue in

Maricopa County Superior Court is proper for this Complaint for Special Action pursuant to **Rule 4(b)**, **R.P.S.A.**, because **a)** actions involving a state agency may be brought in Maricopa County Superior Court; because **b)** the cause of action in this case arose in Maricopa County (*i.e.*, Maricopa County is the county in which the state legislature enacted the law that is challenged herein); and because **c)** Maricopa County is the location of principal office of the Defendant, ADC director Charles Ryan, and the principal place of business of the ADC, the state agency in charge of implementing the statute and collecting the illegal tax.

#### III. PARTIES

- **8.** Plaintiff David Arner. David Arner is a citizen of the United States and the State of Arizona who currently is committed to the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections to serve a sentence of incarceration. Plaintiff receives regular deposits to his prisoner spendable account and will be subject to the provisions of **A.R.S. § 31-230.D** on and after July 20, 2011.
- 9. <u>Defendant Charles Ryan</u>. Charles Ryan is the Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, the state agency authorized by **A.R.S.** § 31-230.D to deduct and collect a fee on deposits made to prisoner spendable accounts. Subsequent to enactment of the statute, Defendant Ryan authorized a new administrative procedure establishing a 1% fee on all deposits made to prisoner spendable accounts on or after July 20, 2011 (see ¶ 14 of this Complaint).

#### IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

- **10.** The issues presented for determination by this Court are as follows:
- **10.1.** Whether the statutory provision challenged herein constitutes an unconstitutional tax and a "special law" prohibited by **Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 19 (9) & (20)**; and, if so,

- **10.1.1.** Whether deductions by Defendant from Plaintiff's prisoner spendable account are without or in excess of legal authority; and
- **10.1.2.** Whether Plaintiff is entitled to an Order declaring the statute unconstitutional and prohibiting Defendant from deducting a 1% fee on deposits made to Plaintiff's prisoner spendable account; and
- **10.1.3.** Whether Plaintiff is entitled to an Order for reimbursement of all monies actually deducted on or after July 20, 2011 from deposits to his prisoner spendable account.

#### V. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

- **11. A.R.S. § 31-230.D** is the codification of the prisoner spendable accounts portion of Senate Bill 1621 (**SB 1621**).<sup>3</sup>
- **12. A.R.S. § 41-797** is the codification of the Arizona Department of Corrections Building Renewal Fund portion of Senate Bill 1621 (**SB 1621**) and prescribing the use of monies in the fund.<sup>4</sup>
- **13.** Plaintiff is incarcerated within the Arizona Department of Corrections and has a prisoner spendable account to which deposits are made

D. The director may establish by rule a fee for any deposits made to a prisoner spendable account. The director shall deposit, pursuant to sections 35-146 and 35-147, any monies collected pursuant to this subsection in the department of corrections building renewal fund established by section 41-797. A.R.S. § 31-230.D.

A. The department of corrections building renewal fund is established consisting of monies deposited pursuant to section 31-230.... The director shall administer the fund. Monies in the fund are subject to legislative appropriation and are exempt from the provisions of section 35-190 relating to the lapsing of appropriations.

B. The director shall use the monies in the fund for building renewal projects that repair or rework buildings and supporting infrastructure that are under the control of the state department of corrections and that result in maintaining a building's expected useful life. Monies in the fund may not be used for new building additions, new infrastructure additions, landscaping and area beautification, demolition and removal of a building and, except as provided in subsection C of this section, routine preventive maintenance.

C. The director may use up to eight percent of the annual expenditures from the fund for routine preventive maintenance. A.R.S. § 41-797.

on a regular basis. This circumstance will continue beyond July 20, 2011, and Plaintiff has a reasonable expectation that this circumstance will continue throughout his ADC incarceration, with his release currently anticipated to occur in 2014.

14. Defendant Ryan has issued a notification regarding implementation of a 1% fee on deposits to prisoner spendable accounts. A copy of ADC notification #28-11 is attached hereto, designated Arner Attachment B, and now incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein.<sup>5</sup>

#### VI. APPLICABLE LAW

#### A. UNIFORM DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT

The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is codified at **A.R.S. § 12-1831** *et. seq.* (*i.e.*, **A.R.S. § 12-1831** to **A.R.S. § 12-1846**). The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provides, in part, that:

Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such declarations shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.

#### A.R.S. § 12-1831.

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief in the form of an Order declaring the rights and duties of the respective parties with regard to the statutory provision challenged herein, namely, **A.R.S.§ 31-230.D.** Plaintiff also seeks declaratory relief in the form of an Order declaring that the 1% fee authorized in ADC

ADC Notification # 28-11 informs inmates that Director's Instruction # 304 ("**DI-304**") becomes effective on July 20, 2011; that **DI-304** imposes a 1% fee on all deposits to prisoner spendable accounts; and that all monies collected will be deposited to the ADC Building Renewal Fund. <u>See</u> **Arner Attachment B.** 

administrative regulation **DI-304** constitutes an unconstitutional tax and a 1 2 "special law" prohibited by Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 19 (9) & (20). 3 В. EXTRAORDINARY WRITS — SPECIAL ACTIONS The rules of procedure governing special actions are codified and consist 4 5 of Rules 1 to 10, R.P.S.A., 17B A.R.S. A special action is the statutorily revised format for an application for an 6 7 extraordinary writ under the common law or under the formal procedures for 8 extraordinary writs: 9 Rule 1. Nature of the Special Action (a) Relief previously obtained against a body, officer, or person by writs of certiorari, mandamus, or 10 prohibition in the trial or appellate courts shall be obtained in an action under this Rule.... Special forms 11 and proceedings for these writs are replaced by the 12 special action provided by this Rule, and designation of the proceedings as certiorari, mandamus, or 13 prohibition is neither necessary nor proper. Rule 1(a), R.P.S.A. 14 15 The rules governing special actions prescribe a specific and limited set of 16 questions that may be raised, and no other question may be raised by way of special action: 17 The only questions that may be raised in a special action 18 are: 19 (a) Whether the defendant has failed...to perform a duty required by law as to which he has no discretion; or 20 (b) Whether the defendant has proceeded or threatened 21 to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction or legal authority; or 22 (c) Whether a determination was arbitrary or capricious or 23

an abuse of discretion.

**Rule 3, R.P.S.A.** (bold print added).

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Assuming, *arguendo*, that the challenged statute is deemed by this Court to be an unconstitutional tax / special law, Plaintiff raises the question

authorized by **Rule 3(b)**, *i.e.*, whether any and all deductions by Defendant Ryan from Plaintiff's prisoner spendable account pursuant to **A.R.S. § 31-230.D** and **ADC DI-304** on or after July 20, 2011 constitutes action "without or in excess of legal authority."

A non-statutory special action is available under **Rule 1**, **R.P.S.A.**, only where a plaintiff has no plain, adequate, and speedy remedy at law or by appeal. Under Arizona law, there is no statutory special action for a challenge to a statute's constitutionality (a "statutory special action" is one expressly authorized by the legislature as the procedure to be used in a particular case when seeking judicial review), nor is there a statutory right to appeal from imposition of a fee on deposits to prisoner spendable accounts.

Plaintiff did, in fact, attempt to challenge the 1% fee deduction by filing an grievance within the ADC. <u>See</u> ADC Inmate Letter Response sent to Plaintiff (denying any internal appealability with regard to the 1% fee deduction), attached hereto, designated **Arner Attachment C**, and now incorporated by reference as though fully set forth herein. The Inmate Letter Response informed Plaintiff that the 1 % fee cannot be challenged via the official ADC Administrative Inmate Grievance System, pursuant to **ADC Director's Order 802.01.2** ("**DO 802**"), **subsection 1.2.1** (providing that the ADC grievance system does not address actions of the Governor or State Legislature.

Further, Arizona's statutory procedure for appeals from administrative decisions, *i.e.*, the Administrative Review Act ("ARA"), *i.e.*, A.R.S. § 12-901 to § 12-914 (Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions), is not applicable to ADC. See Rose v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 167 Ariz. 116, 804 P.2d 845 (App.1991, Div.1) and Stanhope v. State, 170 Ariz. 404, 825 P.2d 25 (App.1991, Div.2).

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In **Stanhope**, the challenge involved prisoner classification, and Division Two of the Court of Appeals relied heavily upon the Rose court's detailed analysis of ARA applicability;

> As the court in Rose noted, judicial review of an administrative decision is available only in "contested cases." A.R.S. § 12-901(1). After a detailed discussion of the issue, the court concluded that inmate disciplinary hearings are not contested cases within the meaning of the ARA, finding that the act's procedures are ill-suited to such proceedings. That is no less the case with inmate classification hearings. As appellees have noted, administrative classification proceedings concern matters of internal prison security and administration.

**Stanhope,** 170 Ariz. at 406, 825 P.2d at 27.

In **Rose**, Division One of the Court of Appeals addressed in detail the question of whether the **ARA** applied to inmate disciplinary decisions within the prison setting, and noted that:

> The APA defines "contested case" as "any proceeding, including rate making, price fixing and licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing." A.R.S. § 41-1001.3.

**Rose**, 167 Ariz. at 119, 804 P.2d at 848.

The **Rose** court held that:

Because of the distinct procedural differences between inmate disciplinary hearings and proceedings under the ARA, and the justifications for those differences, we conclude that inmate disciplinary hearings are not "contested cases" within the meaning of the ARA."

**Rose**, 167 Ariz. at 120, 804 P.2d at 849.

In this case, there is no hearing within the ADC for the 1% fee deductions, and there is no determination of rights, duties, or privileges by the ADC with regard to the 1% fee deductions. Accordingly, based upon the **Rose** court's discussion of the definition and applicability of the term "contested case" and the

fact that Plaintiff's case involves an administrative procedure implementing a statutorily authorized fee, it is clear that the ARA provides no route of appeal regarding the 1% fee deduction from prisoner spendable accounts.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has no plain, adequate, and speedy remedy at law or by appeal. Therefore, the only remedy available to Plaintiff is a Complaint for Special Action within the state court system seeking an Order for reimbursement, in conjunction with a declaratory judgment holding that the fee is unconstitutional. The Rules of Procedure for Special Actions were specifically designed to provide a means of judicial review in cases where there is no plain, adequate, and speedy remedy at law or by appeal. See Rule 1, R.P.S.A.

#### C. APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The Arizona Constitution prohibits special laws for the assessment and collection of taxes:

§ 19. No local or special laws shall be enacted in any of the following cases, that is to say:
9. Assessment and collection of taxes.

### Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 19 (9).

In addition, the Arizona Constitution prohibits special laws for the assessment and collection of taxes:

§ 19. No local or special laws shall be enacted in any of the following cases, that is to say:
20. When a general law can be made applicable.

#### Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 19 (20).

A "special law," for purposes of constitutional analysis, is one which "applies only to certain members of a class or to an arbitrarily defined class which is not rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose." See State Compensation Fund v. Symington, 174 Ariz. 188, 192, 848 P.2d 273, 277 (1993) (quoting Arizona Downs v. Arizona Horsemen's Foundation,

130 Ariz. 550	. 557.	637	P.2d 1053	. 1060	(1981)	)

### VII. ARGUMENT

A. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO ASSERT A CHALLENGE TO THE STATUTE / ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION IN THIS CASE BECAUSE HE POSSESSES A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROPERTY INTEREST IN DEPOSITS TO HIS PRISONER SPENDABLE ACCOUNT

Prior case law within this jurisdiction addresses both the content and the constitutional status of ADC prisoner spendable accounts; and holds that prisoners have a protected property interest in the funds in such accounts:

A prisoner's spendable account includes "[a]ll monies that are received by a prisoner and that are not required to be deposited in another account." A.R.S.§31–230(A). The account includes monetary gifts received from a prisoner's family.

State v. Stocks, 2011 WL 2275975, (App., 2011Div.1), at ¶ 3, note 1.6

...the State concedes...that Defendant has a protected property interest in the funds in his spendable account. See Zuther, 199 Ariz, at 111, ¶ 24, 14 P. 3d at 302 (prisoner has property rights in earned wages that implicate due process); Mahers v. Halford, 76 F.3d 951, 954 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir.1996) (prisoner has protected property interest in money held in prison account received from outside sources).

**State v. Stocks**, *supra*, at ¶ 10 (emphasis by bold print added).

B. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS BEARING UPON WHETHER THE 1% FEE ON DEPOSITS TO PRISONER SPENDABLE ACCOUNTS IS A PERMISSIBLE FEE OR A TAX AND A CONSTITUTIONALLY-PROHIBITED SPECIAL LAW.

Plaintiff contends that the 1% fee on deposits to his prisoner spendable account pursuant to **DI-304** and pursuant to the statute that collects such funds and mandates the use of the funds for the Arizona Department of Corrections Building Renewal Fund is a tax and an unconstitutional "special law" in violation of **Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 19 (9) & (20).** 

Plaintiff possesses only the Westlaw citation for this 2011 case.

In determining whether an assessment is a fee or a tax, this Court should consider the following questions: (1) was the assessment imposed by the legislature or a lesser political entity; (2) is the assessment used for a general public purpose; (4) are the collected monies subject to acquisition by the legislature for public purposes; (5) is the assessment used for the regulation of the group upon whom the assessment is imposed; (6) does the assessment result in a special benefit to the group compelled to pay the assessment; and (7) is the amount of the assessment based upon the theory of furnishing a service to the group compelled to pay the assessment, and, if so, is the scale of the assessment in reasonable proportion to the service provided.

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# 1. The Monies Collected by the Assessment Are Statutorily Dedicated to a Public Purpose.

The assessment is for a general public purpose ("The director shall deposit..., any monies collected pursuant to this subsection in the department of corrections building renewal fund established by section 41-797."). A.R.S. § 31-230.D (quoted in full at Note 3, herein).

The legislature expressly limited the use of the monies, in specific detail:

B. The director shall use the monies in the fund for building renewal projects that repair or rework

buildings and supporting infrastructure that are under the control of the state department of

corrections and that result in maintaining a building's expected useful life. Monies in the fund

may not be used for new building additions, new infrastructure additions, landscaping and area

beautification, demolition and removal of a building and, except as provided in subsection C of this section,

C. The director may use **up to eight percent of the** 

annual expenditures from the fund for routine

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A.R.S. § 41-797 (bold print added) (quoted in full at Note 4, herein).

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# 2. The Assessment Was Imposed by Authorization of the Legislature, the Taxing Authority of the State.

The assessment on deposits to prisoner spendable accounts, with the monies mandatorily placed in the Arizona Department of Corrections Building Renewal Fund, was imposed by the state legislature, the fundamental taxing entity/authority of the state, rather than imposed by a lesser entity.

Taxing in the State of Arizona is a function of the legislature, and other, lesser, entities may impose a tax only pursuant to a formal delegation enacted by the legislature. In this case, the state agency which is to collect the "fee" is not the entity which imposed the fee; instead, the assessment was accomplished by statutory enactment of the primary taxing authority ("The director may establish by rule a fee for any deposits made to a prisoner spendable account." See A.R.S. § 31-230.D.

# 3. The Monies Collected by the Assessment Are Subject to Legislative Appropriation for Other Public Purposes.

Further, despite the statutorily-specified general public use for monies in the ADC Building Renewal Fund, the legislature nonetheless expressly provided that the monies may be appropriated for yet other public purposes. **A.R.S.** § 41-797.A ("Monies in the fund are subject to legislative appropriation....") (bold print added).

# 4. The Assessment Is Not a Voluntary Charge Paid in Return for a Public Service That Bestows a Specific Benefit on the Particular Group Assessed.

The Arizona Supreme Court has distinguished between a fee and a tax by noting that a fee is a voluntary charge paid in return for a public service that bestows a particular benefit on the recipient, "while a tax is a forced contribution of wealth to meet the public needs of the government." **Stewart v. Verde River** 

Irrigation & Power District, 49 Ariz. 531, 534, 544-45, 68 P.2d 329, 330, 334-35 (1937). From an examination of the statutory directions for the use of the collected monies — general building renewal projects that repair or rework ADC buildings and supporting infrastructure, along with routine preventive maintenance — it is quite clear that the 1% fee on deposits to prisoner spendable accounts is "a forced contribution of wealth to meet the public needs of the government." The actual purpose for the monies collected by the assessment that is challenged by Plaintiff is unambiguously established by express language of the authorizing statute. See detailed discussion in Section VII.B. 1, above. As a result of the legislative restriction on the use of the monies accrued by the assessment, it is clear that the monies are NOT used for the regulation or direct benefit of the parties upon whom the assessment is imposed.

Plaintiff concedes that a fee which is imposed upon a select group and is used to defray the costs of specific services or benefits to members of the group upon whom the fee is assessed is, in all likelihood, a permissible enactment not violative of the state constitution. Because the assessment in this case is based upon deposits to prisoner spendable accounts, this Court might be presented with an argument that the group of persons who are assessed the fee do receive a particular benefit or service in return for the assessment, namely, that the ADC allows prisoners to maintain accounts for their funds and that the ADC manages those accounts for the prisoners. It is conceivable that such an argument might include the claim that the fee is a voluntary one because prisoners are not required by law to make deposits to their prisoner spendable accounts.

There are two problems with such an argument. First, the Department of Corrections, however, was not authorized by the legislature to collect the fee for

the purpose of defraying the costs of maintaining and/or managing the prisoner accounts. Any attempt to so claim would at once be revealed as a sheer pretext, because the statute expressly mandates that the monies collected be deposited to the ADC Building Renewal Fund, not the costs of managing and maintaining prisoner accounts. <sup>7 8</sup> Second, unless the ADC implemented a procedure whereby prisoners could utilize their funds to make purchases within the prison setting without making deposits to prisoner spendable accounts, it would be facetious to assert that the decision to make a deposit is a voluntary one.

Moreover, pursuant to the language of the challenged statute, only those prisoners who have funds deposited to their spendable accounts are assessed

A. The director may deposit any funds of offenders in his possession with the state treasurer or, subject to the approval of the state treasurer, deposit such funds in interest bearing bank accounts. Any proceeds from such deposits shall be deposited in the special services fund.

B. Funds of individual offenders may be commingled by the department only for the purpose of deposit pursuant to this section.

**41-1604.05** (bold print added).

All proceeds accrued from such ADC-deposited interest-bearing accounts comprised of prisoner funds are to be deposited in a separate fund, the ADC Special Services Fund, and expenditures from that fund are limited by statute:

A. A special services fund is established in the state department of corrections. The department shall administer the fund.

B. The special services fund, including the inmate recreation fund, may be used for the following purposes:

1. The benefit, education and welfare of committed offenders, including the establishment, maintenance, purchase of items for resale and other necessary expenses of operation of canteens and hobby shops.

2. To pay the costs of a telephonic victim notification system. Revenues that are generated by the inmate telephone system and the automated public access program shall be deposited in the special services fund.

A.R.S. § 41-1604.03.

By statute, the Department of Corrections is permitted to place combined / commingled inmate monies in interest-bearing accounts (with the approval of the state treasurer), but the interest earned is not credited to inmate accounts:

the fee. Under the challenged statute, those prisoners who do not have deposits to their spendable accounts are not assessed any fee in any amount at all. Yet the benefit that accrues from the use of the funds deposited to the ADC Building Renewal Fund accrues to all prisoners, and to all who use ADC buildings, not merely to the group who is assessed the fee. Even further, the burden imposed by the assessment does not fall equally upon all members of the sub-group, but rather the amount of the fee differs from person to person, because those persons who have greater monetary deposits pay a greater monetary assessment.

The Arizona Supreme Court — in the course of discussing what constitutes a tax rather than a fee — has held that a tax relates to the taxpayer's ability to pay based on the taxpayer's property or income rather than its relationship to any particular government service provided to the payees. **Verde River**, *supra*, 49 Ariz. at 544-45, 68 P.2d at 334-35. Here, the prisoners who are compelled to pay the assessment are those prisoners who receive monies deposited to their accounts **and the assessment is wholly unrelated to any particular benefit not accorded to others who do not pay the <b>assessment**.

#### C. THE 1% FEE MEETS THE TESTS FOR A TAX AND A SPECIAL LAW

Whether an assessment should be categorized as a tax or a fee is generally determined by examining three factors: (1) the entity that imposes the assessment; (2) the parties upon whom the assessment is imposed; and (3) whether the monies accrued by the assessment are expended for general public purposes or used for the regulation or benefit of the parties upon whom the assessment is imposed. Jachimek v. State of Arizona, 205 Ariz. 632, ¶ 9, 74 P.3d 944, ¶ 9, (App.2003, Div.1), citing May v. McNally, 203 Ariz. 425,

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## The Assessment In this Case Is A Tax, Not A Fee

Two of the three elements reveal the assessment here as a tax and the third element reveals the tax as a special law. The assessment was authorized by the Legislature, not a lesser entity (see section VII B. 2., herein); the monies collected are subject to appropriation by the legislature (see A.R.S. § 41-797.A); the assessment is not related to the regulation of or a benefit to the parties upon whom the assessment was imposed (see section VII B. 4., herein); the assessment is imposed for a general public purpose (the maintenance and renewal of buildings used by the ADC, section VII B. 1., herein); and the assessment is imposed upon a very narrow range of payers, inmates committed to the custody of the state who have monies deposited to their prisoner spendable accounts, but the assessment is for the benefit of the polity of the State of Arizona, of <u>all</u> who use the buildings, including ADC employees, other prisoners who do not have deposits to their spendable accounts, law enforcement officers who interview prisoners at the prison, volunteers from the community, university and college tour groups, and victims' reconciliation groups who meet within the ADC. The State of Arizona constitutionally must provide and maintain all buildings used by the Department of Corrections as part of the state criminal justice system. The conclusion to be drawn from the examination of the factors discussed in **Iachimek** is that the assessment imposed in this case constitutes a tax, not a fee.

#### 2. The Assessment In this Case Is A Special Law

Assuming, arguendo, that this Court deems the assessment to be a tax rather than a fee, it is incumbent upon this Court to determine whether the tax is being imposed in an unconstitutional manner.

The state constitution prohibits the enactment of special laws where a general law can serve:

# § 19. No local or special laws shall be enacted in any of the following cases, that is to say:

- 9. Assessment and collection of taxes.
- 20. When a general law can be made applicable.

#### Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 19 (9) & (20).

It is unquestionable that a general law taxing the citizenry of the state provides monies for the general fund of the state and such tax monies provide the source for the maintenance and renewal of buildings under the control of the Department of Corrections. Here, the legislature has enacted a special law, one which "applies only to certain members of a class or to an arbitrarily defined class which is not rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose" (see State Comp. Fund v. Symington, 174 Ariz. 188, 192, 848 P.2d 273, 277 (1993) (quoting Ariz. Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen's Found., 130 Ariz. 550, 557, 637 P.2d 1053, 1060 (1981)).

In this case, the persons who use the buildings under the control of the Department of Corrections include, but unquestionably are not limited to prisoners. Other who use the buildings include Department officials, Department staff and employees, members of the public who have business with the Department, and the general citizenry of the state, who benefit from the incarceration and rehabilitation of prisoners committed to the care and custody of the department. Of the class of persons who use Department of Corrections buildings or who derive a benefit from the use of ADC buildings, the statute authorizing the assessment of a fee "applies only to certain members of [the] class, namely, prisoners within the ADC who receive deposits to their prisoner spendable accounts.

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# 3. The Statute Authorizing the Fee Does Not Have a "Legitimate Legislative Purpose"

As previously mentioned, the Arizona Supreme Court has addressed the issue of a special law (one which "applies only to certain members of a class or to an arbitrarily defined class which is not rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose" (see State Comp. Fund v. Symington, 174 Ariz. 188, 192, 848 P.2d 273, 277 (1993) (quoting Ariz. Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen's Found., 130 Ariz. 550, 557, 637 P.2d 1053, 1060 (1981)). Within the context of a fee challenged as a pretext for an unconstitutional special law actually imposing a tax, not a fee, a "legitimate legislative purpose" requires a direct connection between the use of the monies collected and a service or benefit unique to the parties assessed:

¶ 15 Here, there is clearly a legitimate governmental objective—to provide fire and emergency services to the county island residents. Moreover, the population designated in the legislation, the county island residents who will be losing their fire and emergency services, is rationally related to that objective. The legislation was enacted to assist the county island residents in solving the problem of their impending loss of services. Therefore, the first prong of the test is satisfied because the population classification is rationally related to the legislation's objective of providing fire and emergency services to those in need.

Town of Gilbert v. Maricopa County, 213 Ariz. 241, ¶ 15, 141 P.3d 416, ¶ 15 (App.2006, Div.1).

Thus, the legislative purpose behind the statute in this case is not a legitimate legislative purpose, because the assessment does not provide any service or benefit unique to the parties assessed. The purpose is to fund general building renewal projects that repair or rework buildings and supporting infrastructure, along with routine preventive maintenance, but not by means of

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a constitutionally imposed tax, but rather by an assessment upon the varying monetary assets of a subset of prisoners. This is not a legitimate legislative purpose, because it represents an attempt to shift the legitimate tax burden of the general citizenry of the State to a limited portion of a specialized group who derive no special benefit from the use of the monies taken from them.

In Plaintiff's case, there is no direct connection between the use of the monies collected and any service or benefit unique to the parties assessed. The monies collected are not used for any purpose associated with prisoner spendable accounts, such as managing and maintaining the accounts, nor any direct connection to any service or benefit unique to prisoners who receive deposits to their spendable accounts (as opposed to all those who use ADC buildings).

The actual benefit arising from the statutorily directed use of the monies — ADC building renewal and maintenance— accrues not only to a) prisoners in the custody of the ADC who have deposits to their spendable accounts and prisoners in the custody of the ADC who do not have deposits to their spendable accounts, but also to b) the entire population of the State of Arizona (by defraying the tax burden associated with maintaining buildings under control of the state agency) and c) all persons who use ADC buildings regularly or intermittently. This latter group includes (1) state and federal law enforcement officers and officials who interview prisoners at the prison; (2) Board of Executive Clemency members, Board staff, and members of the public attending Board hearings conducted within the ADC; (3) staff and employees of the ADC; (4) those persons who visit ADC prisoners; (5) ADC approved program volunteers from the community; (6) institutions and organizations that provide services to prisoners and/or to ADC staff and employees; (7) university and

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college tour groups; and **(8)** victim reconciliation participants at meeting within ADC institutions.

Accordingly, it is clear that there is no constitutionally sufficient connection between the specific population that is assessed the 1% fee and a benefit derived from that fee not accruing to others who are not assessed the fee. Hence, the fee is an unconstitutionally imposed tax and the statute is an unconstitutional special law.

#### RELIEF REQUESTED

**WHEREFORE,** based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff requests this Court accept this Complaint for Special Action and Declaratory Judgment and order relief as follows:

- 1. Issue an Order declaring the statute authorizing a fee on deposits to prisoner spendable accounts with the monies to be deposited into the Arizona Department of Corrections Building Renewal Fund, *i.e.*, A.R.S. § 31-230.D, to be a tax, not a fee;
- 2. Issue an Order declaring A.R.S. § 31-230.D to be an unconstitutionally imposed tax;
- 3. Issue an Order striking down A.R.S. § 31-230.D as a special law prohibited by Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 19 (9) & (20);
- **4.** Issue an Order striking down the Arizona Department of Corrections administrative regulation establishing a 1% fee on deposits to prisoner spendable accounts, *i.e.*, **Director's Instruction 304 (DI-304)**, to be a regulation not authorized by law and therefore of no further force and effect;
- **5.** Issue an Order requiring Defendant Charles Ryan, Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, to reimburse Plaintiff for all

deductions from Plaintiff's prisoner spendable account that were assessed pursuant to **A.R.S. § 31-230.D** / **DI-304**; and to do so within 45 days of the date of this Court's Order;

- 6. Award Plaintiff reasonable costs, expenses, and fees, including filing fees for the Complaint; service of process expenses for all parties served pursuant to law; reasonable copying costs for documents served; and first class postage for all documents (subsequent to service of the Summons and Complaint) that were served by mail; and
- **7.** Grant such other and further relief as this Court deems reasonable, necessary, or just.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of July, 2011.

David C. Arner, Plaintiff pro se

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2	\{\bar{\}} ss	. VERIFICATION
3	COUNTY OF PIMA	
4		
5	I, <u>David C. Arner</u> , being first of state the following:	duly sworn upon my oath, depose and
6		he above referenced matter
7		the above referenced matter.
3	2. I have caused to be prepare Declaratory Judgment to w I know the contents thereof	d the Complaint for Special Action and hich this Verification is attached, and to be true based upon my own personal
9	knowledge, except such information and helief and	matters as are stated to be upon as to those matters, I believe them to be
` ∦	true.	
L		D.C. arner
2	]	David C. Arner, Plaintiff pro se
.		lable to Plaintiff at time of signing
	this Verification I hereby affirm th	nat the above statements are true
,		David C. Arner 7-14-11
.	·	David C. Arner 7-14-11
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	<ul> <li>When a Notary Public becomes av</li> <li>Complaint before a Notary and file the su</li> </ul>	ailable to Plaintiff, he will re-verify this applemental Verification with the Court.



# ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

#### INMATE NOTIFICATION

**Notification Number:** 

28-11

Issue Date:

June 10, 2011

#### **POSTING NOTIFICATION**

This information is to be posted for a minimum of 30 days in areas accessible to inmates and shall be made available to inmates who do not have access to posted copies.

#### TO ALL INMATES

Director's Instruction # 304, Inmate Trust Account Fees will be effective July 20, 2011.

A 1% fee will be deducted from all deposits made to the Inmate spendable account. All fees collected will be deposited into the Building Renewal Fund.

Charles L. Ryan

Director

#### **ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS**

58020

#### For distribution: Copy of corresponding Inmate Letter must be attached to this response.

#### Inmate Letter Response

Inmate Name (Last, First M.I.) Arner, David	ADC Number 139866	
Institution/Unit ASPC-T / Winchester		

From Location
CO III Estrella Winchester

Re: Informal Grievance Pertaining to DI#304

According to SB 1621, Section 11:

- A. The director shall establish a prisoner spendable account for each prisoner. All monies that are received by a prisoner and that are not required to be deposited in another account shall be deposited in the prisoner's spendable account.
- B. The director shall adopt rules for the disbursement of monies from prisoner spendable accounts.
- C. If the court has ordered the prisoner to pay restitution pursuant to section 13-603, the director shall withdraw a minimum of twenty per cent, or the balance owing on the restitution amount, up to a maximum of fifty per cent of the monies available in the prisoner's spendable account each month to pay the court ordered restitution.
- D. THE DIRECTOR MAY ESTABLISH BY RULE A FEE FOR ANY DEPOSITS MADE TO A PRISONER SPENDABLE ACCOUNT. THE DIRECTOR SHALL DEPOSIT, PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 35-146 AND 35-147, ANY MONIES COLLECTED PURSUANT TO THIS SUBSECTION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS BUILDING RENEWAL FUND ESTABLISHED BY SECTION 41-797.

Per DO 802.01.2:

The following are not grievable under the Inmate Grievance Procedure:

- 1.2.1 Actions of the Governor or State Legislature.
- 1.2.2 Decisions of the Board of Executive Clemency.
- 1.2.3 Judicial proceedings or decisions of the Courts.

Since the policy you are attempting to grieve is an action of the State Legislature, your issue is not grievable and if you decide to do so it will be returned to you as unprocessed. End of repsonse.

Staff Signature	Date
A HAA	06/27/2011
Computer Electronic Version ()	

Distribution: Original - Central Office Master File

Copy - Immate

Copy - Institutional File

#### ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Requests are limited to one page and one issue.NO
ATTACHMENTS PERMITTED. Please print all information.

Immate Letter					
Inmate Name (Last, First M.L.)  ARNER DAVID C	139866	Institution/Unit 5-B-Z-B	Date 6-25-11		
COI Estrella	Location Winchester	- Unit Bldg 5			
State briefly but completely the problem on which yo			,		
I am attempting to resolve agrievance regarding the 1% Tax on inmate deposits:					
1% lax on inmeted	I believe that the the D.O.C taking my				
- vellere that	the the D. (	D.C taking r	ny		
deposit money for	the building	renewal fund	4		
is illegal.	9				
<b>y</b>					
Inmate Signature Q.C. Ceru	<u> </u>	June 25	,2011		
Have You Discussed This With Institution Staff?	X Vas TNo TUI				

If yes, give the staff member's name: